A. About the Connection of the Moral Virtues with Each Other

1. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

a. Exposition of the Opinion

11. As to the first, the following is said [Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet 5 q.16]. The Philosopher in Ethics 7.1-2.1145a15-b20 says that in every genus of goodness and badness it is possible to distinguish four grades. The first in the genus (that is, its beginning stage) is what by the Philosopher is called perseverance, the second grade is continence, the third temperance, and in the fourth is what is called heroic virtue. In the first two grades, to be sure, there is no virtue but only a certain imperfect disposition, on which perfect virtue naturally follows. In the third grade there is virtue commonly so called. But in the fourth grade the virtue is excellently so called, and exists in surpassing degree.

12. It is admitted, then, that in the first two grades there is not virtue, because in the habits of the virtues someone can be exercised in the acts of one virtue and not in those of another, and thus acquire perseverance as well as temperance, and one and not the other.

13. In the third grade a distinction is drawn, because virtue in that grade can be inchoate or average or perfect.

14. And so in the first two degrees [sc. of the third grade, the inchoate and average] there does not have to be a connection, for the same reason as before [n.12], because one can be exercised in the acts of one virtue according to these degrees and not in those of another.

15. But in the third degree of the third grade [n.13], and much more in the fourth grade [n.11], there is a connection.

16. The proof is multiple:

First as follows [Henry of Ghent Quodlibet 5 q.17]: “That is not perfect and true virtue which can fall away to the contrary of its end and fail, according to what Augustine says in a sermon about the works of mercy [Paulinus of Aquila, On Salutary Doctrines ch. 7, mistakenly included in the works of Augustine], ‘A charity that can be abandoned was never true’.” But if a moral virtue existed alone without the others, it could fall away from its end;     therefore it was not true virtue. The proof of the minor is that one virtue does not strengthen the will as regard other desirable things that it does not concern. Therefore , if the will only has this virtue, it can fall away as regard other desirable things that are presented to it. But by falling away as to these other things it can fall away as to the object of this virtue too; therefore etc     .

17. This is plain in an example: for he who has fortitude and not temperance is not firm in resisting delightful things. Similarly, he who has temperance and not fortitude is not firm in enduring terrible things. Therefore, if terrible and delightful things are presented to him at the same time, as that he commit fornication or undergo death, he can fall away as to the terrible things and so about the things of fortitude (and not about the things of temperance). For such a person would choose not to undergo death than not to fornicate, because he is not firm as to the terrible suffering.

18. A second argument to the same effect is as follows: it is a feature of virtue to work delightfully (from Ethics 2.5.1106a15-17); but one virtue without another is not a principle of delightful activity. The point is plain in the aforesaid example [n.17]. For if, when tempted as to intemperance, he does not have fortitude, he will, without delight, flee the things that belong to temperance, and so he is perfectly temperate only if he also has fortitude. An example can be put forward in the same way about avarice, that if someone is greedy he will choose to keep his money rather than his temperance.

19. Further, third as follows: perfect virtue leads to the end of virtue, because leading to the end is what perfection is in morals. But no virtue without the others leads one to the end, not oneself by oneself nor man in political community.     Therefore etc     .

20. There is a confirmation of this position in Gregory Moralia 22.1 n.2, “Whoever is held to be strong in virtue is then truly strong if he is not subject to vices on the other side.” And again 21.3 n.6, “One virtue without another is not perfect virtue, or rather is not virtue at all.” The commentator too on the beginning of Ethics 6 [Eustratius, On the Ethics 6 ch.6], “When temperance does not exist, how will there be justice?” - as if he were to say, “in no way will there be justice.” Again, the same commentator on the Ethics [ibid.], “We call temperance by this name [sc. so-phrosune in Greek] as being ‘what saves prudence’ [sozein phronesin];” and “The virtues are sisters to each other etc.”

21. The same is proved by the gloss on Revelation 21, “The city lies four square” [in Nicholas of Lyra 6 folio 272v “The four sides are the four principal virtues”].

b. Rejection of the Opinion

22. Against this there are many arguments.

[First argument] - First as follows: for you [sc. Henry] the two grades (perseverance and continence) turn out not to be connected, and likewise the first two degrees of the third grade (namely when virtue is imperfect or average) [nn.12-14]. I argue in the same way about virtue in the third grade of virtue, namely that someone who has virtue in the two first degrees of the third grade can be exercised in the third degree of one virtue and not in the third degree of another. For someone who has a habit of acting as regard the latter objects is not less disposed than someone else who has no such habit. So, if someone could exercise himself from the beginning about the objects of one virtue and not of another, then he will, when he has the habit of one virtue up to the first two degrees of the third grade, be much more able to exercise himself about the object of one virtue and not of the other, and so be able to acquire one perfect virtue for himself and not another. There is a confirmation, because opportunity to act on the matter of the other virtue (so as to be inclined toward it as he is inclined to what he has the habit of) may not be presented to him.

23. If it be said that, although the matter of the other virtue may not be presented to him externally, yet it is presented to him in imagination and he will have to make right choices about that, else the virtue acquired in any degree will not be preserved; - on the contrary: it is possible for the intellect not to consider the other things, but only those to which the habit of virtue inclines, for the intellect cannot understand two things distinctly at the same time, according to the common way of speaking [Ord. IV d.1 q.1 nn.22-23]. Or if other things do occur to it that belong to the other virtue, the will cannot make choices good or bad about them, but prescribes non-consideration of these other things and consideration of the things that belong to the virtue it does have. And so the proposed conclusion [n.22] will stand.

24. Alternatively it is said, and better, that a habit, however perfect it be in its natural genus, can be acquired from acts frequently elicited about the object of one virtue without the acquisition of another virtue; but the habit, however intense it is, will not be a virtue because it does not have the idea of virtue unless it is conformed to the other virtues already acquired in the same person, for the agreement of habit with habit is necessary in any habit for it to have the idea of virtue.

25. This statement [n.24] could be easily rejected if moral virtue were a per se being or per se one thing in the genus of quality.

26. But because I do not believe this to be true, as will be touched on below [nn.27-30], I therefore argue differently as follows: a virtue, when it has everything that belongs per se to the idea of virtue, is generated by acts conformed to right reason, so that the idea of a virtuous habit or act requires, over and above the nature of act and habit, only conformity to right reason. The proof is in Ethics 2.6.1106b36-07a2: “Virtue is a habit of choice as determined by reason.” But such conformity of habit and act with the right reason by which a person chooses can exist without the agreement of the other virtues present together in the same agent. The assumption here is plain, for one only rightly chooses in the matter of temperance if reason that is right and gives commands about such choices precedes. But it is possible for right command about one virtue to precede without there being any right command about the matter of some other virtue.     Therefore etc     .

27. [Second argument] - Further second: it follows from what was said [n.22] that any virtue will be the reason for the existence of another virtue; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. Proof of the consequence: for if the habit is not the virtue of temperance save because another virtue, say fortitude, is concomitant with it, then the virtue of fortitude, insofar as it is concomitant, will be the reason for that habit’s being the virtue of temperance. And by parity of reasoning temperance, as concomitant, will conversely be the reason for fortitude’s being a virtue; and any virtue generally will be the reason for another habit’s being a virtue. The consequent is false because it follows that some virtue will be a virtue before it is a virtue, and so there will be no first virtue.

28. Proof of all this.

Let us take that habit in the genus of quality which temperance must be. If this habit cannot be a virtue unless the virtue that is fortitude is concomitant with it, then fortitude will be a virtue before temperance is a virtue. And fortitude cannot be a virtue unless the virtue of temperance is concomitant with it, ex hypothesi [n.27]. Therefore, fortitude will be a virtue before it is a virtue.

29. The same point proves that there will be no first virtue [n.27]. For temperance is not the first virtue because it cannot be a virtue without the concomitance of all the other virtues possessing the idea of virtue (ex hypothesi). Nor will any other be first, because no other virtue can be a virtue without the concomitance of temperance as a virtue.

30. If it be said to this, and with probability, that a virtue can be a virtue when it has all the virtues concomitant with it, and although, in the idea by which it is one habit, it precede another, yet not in the idea by which it is a virtue; but all the habits, whether generated earlier or later, have the idea of virtue from their own nature and from mutual concomitance. - Against this: Then it follows that one act will generate all the moral virtues in their being as virtue, which seems unacceptable. Proof of this consequence: For suppose that the habit which is temperance has been generated, and consequently that the habit which is fortitude has been generated, and to like degree; eventually none of these habits will be a virtue until each habit is in the degree in which it is a virtue. Either then each habit exists before another or it does not. If it does then the conclusion is gained, namely that one habit can exist without another, and so there is no connection of the virtues. If each habit does not exist before another, then the habits will come to be at once through one act that has the being of virtue, which seems unacceptable, because that act seems to be an act of a virtue [sc. so some virtue would have to exist already in order for the act to be an act of that virtue]. And just as it would be an act of a virtue if the virtue had been generated, so it would be generative of a virtue [sc. if the virtue were not yet generated]; therefore it would be generative of them all [sc. for all are virtues together, by mutual concomitance].

31. [Third argument] - Further, third: it seems more reasonable that the species of the same genus in the moral virtues are connected than that two genera are. For one is more inclined to have an ordered disposition about connected matter (from the virtue one has) than about remote matter. Now the matters of the species of the same genus are more connected than the matters of diverse ones. But the species of the same genus of virtue are not connected (as virginity and conjugal chastity); therefore the virtues of all the species are not connected.

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. As to this first article [nn.10-11] I concede that neither in their genera commonly assigned (as justice, fortitude, and temperance) nor in the more general ones that I assigned earlier [d.34 n.33], which is virtue as disposing affection to oneself and to another, are the moral virtues necessarily connected.

33. The evidence for this is as follows: Virtue is some perfection of man, and not total perfection because then one moral virtue would suffice. But when there are several partial perfections of something, that thing can be perfect simply according to one perfection and imperfect simply according to another - as is clear in man, whose property it is to have many organic perfections. Man can have one perfection at its highest, having nothing of another (as that he is supremely disposed to sight or touch but has nothing of hearing). One can therefore have perfection at its highest with respect to the matter of temperance, while having nothing of the perfection that would be required with respect to the matter of another perfection; and consequently one can be simply temperate, even as to any act of temperance, but not simply be moral without all the virtues (just as one is not simply a sensing thing without all the senses). Yet one is not less perfectly temperate, although one is less morally perfect (just as one is not less perfectly sighted nor less perfectly a hearer, although one is less perfectly sentient).

3. To the Arguments for Henry’s Opinion

34. Hereby is plain the answer to certain things touched on for the first opinion, that is, for the possibility of virtue’s falling away [n.16]. This is false of virtue, for virtue does not fall away, but he who has virtue can, through deficiency in another virtue, fall away as regard the matter of that other virtue. But the virtue is not for this reason imperfect, because it is not virtue’s job to direct man about everything but about its own proper objects (just as he who cannot see does not fall away more in hearing than if he could see, but rather he falls away in sensing).

35. If it be argued against this that thus a virtue is easy to lose and so is not a virtue, I deny the antecedent; on the contrary although falling away happen contrary to a virtue’s inclination, the good disposition is not corrupted save by many sins or vices, or by a few intense ones.

36. And the same point makes plain the response to what was said about delightful activity [n.18], for one does act delightfully as to the matter of the relevant virtue taken precisely [n.17]. It is pleasant, I mean, for him to abstain from the works of intemperance, but it is not pleasant for him to undergo terrible things, because he is not in an orderly state with respect to them. Therefore, in sadness he commits an act of intemperance because it is against his habit; but because it would be sadder for him to endure terrible things, he flees what is sadder and in a way chooses involuntarily the less sad so as not to fall into the more sad. I concede therefore that such a person is imperfect and acts sadly; but he is not imperfect, nor does he act sadly about the matter of his virtue [sc. of temperance], save only per accidens, because it is accompanied by another matter [sc. enduring terrible things], about which he is not virtuously disposed so as to act virtuously and delightfully with respect to it.

37. The same makes plain the answer to the point about the end of the moral virtues [n.19], because a single virtue does not lead one perfectly to the end of the virtues, just as neither does a single sensitive power lead man perfectly to the perfect act of sensing. But each virtue leads one as far as is it can, and all are required for leading one perfectly to act virtuously or delightfully. I concede therefore that one virtue does not lead one sufficiently to the end but - as far as in it lies - leads one sufficiently to the end, namely it suffices for the perfection of such virtue.

38. To the first argument that is added there from Blessed Augustine [n.16], I say that the Philosopher does not say in the Categories that a habit cannot be lost, but that it can with difficulty be lost. Although therefore a virtue could be lost and so he who has it could fall away, the virtue itself indeed does not fall away, but he who has it draws back from the peak of virtue. However it does not follow that his virtue was not virtue, even perfect virtue, according to the idea of habit, because it was not incapable of being lost but capable with difficulty of being lost. What therefore Augustine [Paulinus] says about charity needs to be understood as that someone was truly in charity who yet afterwards sinned mortally; but the charity was not the charity which truly joins to the end, that is, to blessedness.

39. To the authorities cited there:

About Gregory [n.20] one can say that he is speaking there about the virtues as they are the principle of gaining merit; and in this way it is true that one moral virtue without another is not virtue, because merit is not gained through one virtue if the others do not accompany it. For he who has moral temperance does not gain merit if humility does not accompany him, or at least if the opposite vice is present in him.

40. The same can be said to the gloss on Revelation [n.21].

41. The same again to the Commentator on Ethics 6, about virtues being sisters to each other [n.20]. I concede that although sisters mutually aid each other for common life, yet one sister is not another, nor does one sister essentially perfect another; the virtues do thus each well help each other mutually, each in saving the other. And in this can be understood the saying of some people that one of them is not complete without another, because one is not thus well preserved without another. For to a man exposed to many temptations in diverse matters, imperfection in one matter can be an occasion for acting imperfectly in another, and a perfect disposition in one matter aids toward right action in another matter; therefore the virtues help each other as sisters. But no virtue is essentially required for the perfection of another, just as one sister is born first without another, and so on, if they cannot be generated together. But two perfect acts cannot always be had together so that through them two virtues might be generated, because one perfect act of one power would impede the act of another power; they could then be generated together?